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a b s t r a c t 
The rapid increase in user base and technological penetration has enabled the use of a 
wide range of devices and applications. The services are rendered to these devices from 
single-server or highly distributed server environments, irrespective of their location. As 
the information exchanged between servers and clients is private, numerous forms of at- 
tacks can be launched to compromise it. To ensure the security, privacy, and availability of 
the services, different authentication schemes have been proposed for both single-server 
and multi-server environments. The primary performance objective of such schemes is to 
prevent most (if not all) attacks, with minimal computational costs at the server and user 
ends. To address this challenge, this paper presents a secure user authentication scheme 
with anonymity (SUAA) for single-server and multi-server environments. It works on 3- 
factor authentication, involving passwords, smart cards, and biometric data. We use sym- 
metric and asymmetric encryption for single-server and multi-server architectures respec- 
tively, to reduce the computational costs. Through a comprehensive security analysis, we 
show that the proposed scheme is reliable through mutual authentication, and is resilient 
to attacks addressed by state of the art solutions. Time cost analysis also shows less time 
required to complete the authentication process. 
© 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The widespread use of the Internet and communication technology has allowed access to remotely located digital re- 
sources at any time and irrespective of geographical location. Numerous applications providing a variety of services, work 
in the client-server model to facilitate user’s personal and business needs. The access to remotely located resources can be 
achieved from single-server design [16] , where all services are centralized at a single point of distribution, or a multi-server 
design [12] where the services are distributed on different servers. The single-server design requires registration of every 
user requesting a service from a specific server. The increasing number of users and their service needs from a single-server 
negatively impacts the communication performance and storage capabilities of the server. The server becomes overwhelmed 
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which hinders the reliability of service and performance. In order to resolve this limitation of a single-server design, the 
multi-server architecture is more commonly used. 
In a multi-server architecture, the design requires a central registration server (Registration Center) to avoid the need of 
every user to register on a specific individual server that renders a specific service. The registration center operates under 
the assumptions that it is trusted by the users and the service providing servers. In addition, different distributed servers 
provide different services to remote users regardless of their geographical locations. 
With the growth of technology, the sensitivity of information stored, and the openness of the Internet, a number of 
security challenges have risen. The user data and the violations of the user’s privacy have become the center of attention 
for the attackers. Due to the openness of the Internet, attackers may become capable of controlling the communications 
medium and be able to launch different kinds of attacks [23] . These include the denial of service attacks, replay attacks, 
transmitted message modification attacks, insider attacks, password guessing attacks, etc. To achieve privacy preservation 
and management of access control [1] , efficient schemes need to be in place to prevent attackers from performing attacks 
successfully. 
For both architectures, i.e., the single-server and the multi-server, the processes of authentication, key agreement, and 
securing information while providing anonymity are the key processes that play a vital role in assuring the two communi- 
cating entities identify and authenticate each other while preserving their privacy. The parties that communicate need to 
authenticate each other before agreeing on the session key for protecting further communications among them. 
Remote user authentication has been widely adopted in today’s world of Internet usage where online interactions have 
increased. This gives an opportunity for the research community to develop authentication schemes for the remote users 
in single-server and multi-server environments. The existing schemes use different factors for authentication. These factors 
can be basic password mechanics [45] or a combination of a password and a smart card issued to them, or even yet a third 
factor of biometric data [15] added to it. Recently, several authentication schemes for the single-server architecture and for 
the multi-server architecture [28] , [32] have been designed. The objective of designing and improving the authentication 
schemes is to attain secure and reliable communications with as less computational time as possible. 
A variety of techniques are used when implementing an authentication algorithm. Non-cryptographic techniques can be 
used in the situation where fake queries are used to hide data [31] , or use of covert channels to relay authentication in- 
formation [48] . Simulation-based non-malleability is used for data protection to resist selective opening attacks [10] . Naive 
Bayes classification [8] can be used to detect certain attacks which are otherwise difficult to discover. Identity-based encryp- 
tion [19] can be used to obtain fine-grained access control in distributed systems. Homomorphic Merkle trees can be used 
for authentication [44] in streaming data structures. For personal areas and smart home applications, authentication can 
be done by using the techniques like lightweight certificate-less authentication [33] , secure data upload from authenticated 
gateways [34] , or by creating traceable anonymous groups [35] . It is important to note that the technique used, contributes 
to the computational complexity of the overall solutions. Most of the schemes which use cryptographic hash tend to use 
less computational time, but they do not provide strong security features compared with those using symmetric and public 
key encryptions. The later schemes seem to provide reliable security, but most of them have higher computational cost. Two 
main goals can be drawn from this discussion, which is also the main objective of our work. 
• Reduction in high computational cost among communicating entities. 
• Reduction in security weakness that allows an adversary to successfully launch certain kind of attacks. 
In light of this, a scheme for authentication in a single-server and multi-server architecture is desired, which provides 
anonymity for the user and better defense against a diverse range of attacks, while keeping lower computational and com- 
munication cost. It needs to preserve the anonymity of the participants during the session run, which assures their privacy. 
The scheme also should be able to generate secure session keys, which can be used for future data encryption. We propose 
a Secure User Authentication with Anonymity (SUAA) scheme for single-server and multi-server architectures with the use 
of smart cards and biometric data. SUAA scheme utilizes symmetric and asymmetric encryption on single and multi-server 
design respectively, along with hash functions and random nonces. The proposed scheme is proven to be secure against 
diverse security attacks and has less computation time compared to the existing state-of-the-art works. 
This work is arranged as follows: related works and contributions are provided in Section 2 . Section 3 discusses the 
preliminaries and the adversarial model. The proposed SUAA authentication scheme is given in Section 4 . The first part 
explains the single-server design authentication and the second part presents the multi-server design authentication scheme. 
Security evaluation of our scheme is presented in Section 5 and the proof of authentication is presented in Section 6 . The 
security and performance evaluation of SUAA is presented in Section 7 . The conclusion of our work is presented in Section 8 . 
2. Related works and contributions 
In this part, the related literature is reviewed for single-server and multi-server authentication schemes, and major con- 
tributions of our work are described. 
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2.1. Related works 
Lamport [16] introduced password-based remote user authentication scheme in an insecure environment, based on which 
many works have been proposed later, most of which are for single-server authentication. Yen and Liao [45] argued that 
Lamport’s scheme cannot resist stolen verifier attacks. The authors showed that an adversary can obtain a user’s private 
information by having access to the server database. After obtaining the information, adversaries can launch offline password 
guessing attacks and impersonate the users. 
To overcome this security weakness, the schemes based on smart cards have been proposed in the literature. The smart 
card based scheme was initially proposed in [11] . However, Chan and Cheng showed that this design cannot resist im- 
personation attacks [2] . To preserve the anonymity during the authentication process, a dynamic identity authentication 
mechanism with the use of smart cards was proposed in [22] , but was found to be prone to security threats [46] . 
Wang et al. [41] improved the authentication scheme proposed in [7] , to add mutual authentication and password in- 
dependent user authentication, while keeping the merits of the original work. However, the work in [42] shows that it is 
prone to information leak and suffers from impersonation attacks. In continuation of this work, Chang et al. [5] improved its 
performance and added untraceable dynamic identity and verifiable password update mechanics. Later, Kumari et al. found 
ways to launch impersonation and password guessing attacks [14] . They proposed to mitigate these weaknesses, but recently 
Morteza et al. [29] showed that it is not immune to offline password guessing attacks and cannot provide user anonymity. 
It can be observed from this discussion that, the improvement in authentication mechanisms has been gradual. Newer 
ways to counter security attacks and the improvements have also evolved in recent times. The combination of passwords, 
smart cards, and biometric information was introduced for the purpose of improving security and maintaining the privacy of 
the users [17] . Smart cards and biometric-based authentication schemes were created to enhance security and to overcome 
the attacks such as replay attacks, man-in-the-middle, smart-card stolen attacks, and others [18] . While most of the schemes 
were based on the single-server environment, it was observed that the single-server design cannot meet the demand of 
growing users of the Internet from diverse geographic locations. 
A single-server design suffers from significant shortcomings. The fundamental limitations include insufficient scalability, 
low availability, and performance problems. Moreover, a single-servers is primarily used for small to a medium number of 
users which are not geographically scattered. The single-server architecture requires the registration of the user on each 
server before granting access. This forces a single user to have multiple registrations and maintain a number of user iden- 
tities and passwords with different individual servers. In multi-server architecture, the set of applications are distributed 
among different servers to deliver greater availability of service and scalability. To solve the limitations of single-server 
design, Chand et al. [3] proposed authentication scheme for the multi-server environments which requires only single regis- 
tration. In multi-server design, three actors are involved, namely the Registration Center (RC), application or service servers, 
and users. The users are required to perform registration once at RC. The application servers also register themselves and 
are authorized by the RC. The application server is in charge of verifying and authenticating the users. 
Yoon and Yoo [47] proposed a three-factor scheme for authentication in multi-server with the use of public key cryp- 
tosystem using elliptic curves. However, it was proven by the work in [9] that it is not resistant to insider attacks, stolen 
smart card attacks, offline password-guessing attacks, and masquerade attacks. 
Li et al. [21] proposed an efficient scheme of authentication for multi-server systems with dynamic identities after ob- 
serving that Sood et al.’s scheme [38] is weak against smart card stolen attacks, verifier leakage attacks, and impersonation 
attacks. [37] proposed an authentication scheme with the use of the smart card. However, Li et al. [20] showed that the 
proposed scheme is not secure from offline password-guessing attacks, insider attacks, as well as impersonation attacks. Af- 
terward, Jangirala et al. [12] demonstrated that the improvements were still open to impersonation attacks, denial of service, 
and smart card stolen attacks. They proposed a self-verifiable password authentication scheme for the multi-server environ- 
ment using smart cards, public key Diffie-Hellman technique, and hash functions. Other notable works on authentication for 
the multi-server have been proposed in [30] . 
Chuang and Chen [6] designed a multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme with the use of smart cards and 
biometric data with anonymity based on trust computing. Their scheme was based on cryptographic hash functions and 
random nonces. The scheme was lightweight and suitable for the environments with limited resource devices. However, 
it was observed that it cannot resist smart card stolen attacks, session key compromise attacks, impersonation attacks, 
server spoofing attacks, numerous user login attacks, and the scheme lacks anonymity. Kumari et al. [36] recommended an 
improvement using RSA public key. In their improved scheme, we observed that it has high computational time, due to RSA 
computational complexity. This forms the basic motivation of our work. 
2.2. Contributions of our work 
The problem of secure authentication and access control for remotely located services in single-server and multi-server 
environments has been an open challenge. Most of the proposed schemes in literature are restricted to either a single-server 
design or a multi-server design. Moreover, attaining reasonable security features with minimum computation time has been 
difficult due to complex mathematical operations. Based on these challenges, we propose a unified authentication scheme 
that can operate in a single-server design and also supports multi-server design with significantly less computational com- 
plexity. We use 3-factor authentication, with user passwords, smart cards, and biometric information. The scheme utilizes 
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symmetric and asymmetric encryption, hash functions, and random nonces. It is able to mitigate a diverse range of attacks 
and offers anonymity of the communications. Moreover, it is efficient for both single-server and multi-server environments. 
The SUAA scheme guarantees better security against the aforementioned attacks with fewer computational costs. The key 
contributions of our work are as follows. 
• Firstly, the SUAA scheme of authentication is presented for single-server and multi-server environments, which utilizes 
user biometric information and smart cards. To achieve more security properties, the SUAA scheme utilizes symmetric 
and asymmetric encryption in the protocol design. 
• To evaluate the threat mitigation, comprehensive security analysis is presented. It shows that the SUAA scheme is reliable 
and can operate in insecure environments. 
• Lastly, the computational time of the SUAA scheme is presented which is significantly less compared with other state- 
of-the-art solutions. 
3. Preliminaries and background 
In this section, we present prerequisite information on concepts and techniques used in our work. 
3.1. Cryptographic hash functions 
A secure cryptographic hash function maps a string of an arbitrary length to a string of specific length l , h : { 0 , 1 } ∗ −→ 
{ 0 , 1 } l . The one-wayness of the hash functions are the characteristics that make them suitable for cryptographic applications. 
The following are the required properties for a hash function in cryptography. 
(1) For any value j , it is impossible to have the value k such that j = h (k ) . This is pre-image resistance characteristic of a 
hash function. 
(2) For any given value k 1 , it is computationally difficult to find some other value k 2 where h (k 1 ) = h (k 2 ) and k 1  = k 2 . This 
is the second pre-image resistance. 
(3) It is infeasible to find a message pair ( k 1 , k 2 ) with k 1  = k 2 and h (k 1 ) = h (k 2 ) . This feature makes hash functions collision 
resistant. 
3.2. BAN Logic of authentication 
In authentication protocols, the goal is to make sure the communication is limited among the authorized participants, 
and intruders are not able to access the information. These authorized participants should be entitled to trust that they 
communicate with another authorized participant only. The authentication logic proposed by Burrows, Abadi and Needham 
(BAN) [26] is used by many researchers to express this belief and reasoning among the communicating entities. 
Providing the correctness of any authentication scheme is important in its design. Due to the complexity of security 
schemes, it becomes extremely difficult to perform exhaustive security analysis in different situations. Hence, BAN logic was 
created to assist in the validation of such schemes. A few other methods are also available, such as proverif and AVISPA, but 
BAN logic is chosen in this work because of its formal process and extensive use in literature. 
On the formal analysis of authentication and security of the protocol, the following BAN logic rules and notations are 
defined. 
(1) P | ≡X . X is believed by the entity P . 
(2) P  X . A message X is received by the participant P . 
(3) P | ∼X . P sent X . 
(4) P | ⇒ X . The participant P has full authority over X . 
(5)  ( X ). The message X is new and has not been sent before. 
(6) P 
K ←→ Q . P and Q use a shared key K to communicate with each other. 
(7) { X } K . The key K is used to encrypt X . 
(8) < X > Y . This indicates that the formula X is combined with the formula Y . 
(9) K | → P . K is P ’s public key and P has the corresponding private key K −1 . 
Logical postulates and rules used in BAN logic are presented as follows. 
(1) The message-meaning rule: The rule explains how to create trust about the source of the message 
P |≡ P K ←→ Q, P  { X } K 
P |≡ Q |∼ X . 
The party P believes the key K is shared with Q . P receives X which is encrypted with the key K . Then, P believes the 
message X was sent by Q . 
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(2) Nonce verification rule: This is used to check the freshness of the message and the sender believes in it 
P |≡  (X ) , P |≡ Q |∼ X 
P |≡ Q |≡ X . 
If P believes that X is fresh (recent) and that Q once sent X (either in the past or now). Then P believe that Q believes X . 
(3) The jurisdiction rule: If P believes that Q has power over the message X , then P trusts Q on the trueness of X 
P |≡ Q |⇒ X, P |≡ Q |≡ X 
P |≡ X . 
(4) The belief rule: If P believes Q has trust on the set of messages ( X , Y ), then P believes that Q has trust on the message 
X 
P |≡ Q |≡ (X, Y ) 
P |≡ Q |≡ (X ) . 
(5) The freshness rule: If the component part of the formula is fresh, then the whole formula is fresh 
P |≡  (X ) 
P |≡  (X, Y ) . 
3.3. Requirements for protocol design 
The protocol design for the single-server and multi-server authentication has to conform to the following security re- 
quirements; 
(1) Single registration: This requirement needs the users to register only once. Our SUAA scheme for multi-server accom- 
plishes this by allowing the user and the server that participate in the protocol to register at RC only once. 
(2) Session key agreement: Ensuring secure communications between the user and the server, the SUAA scheme provides 
the server and the user to agree on the session key. 
(3) Mutual authentication: In order to ensure that the communicating entities are the ones that they claim to be, mutual 
authentication is required to provide this proof. In SUAA, communicating entities authenticate each other first before the 
session key is generated. 
(4) Providing user anonymity: The user’s privacy is guaranteed and tracing is prevented from the attackers by our SUAA 
scheme. The user’s identity has to be concealed to avoid an adversary from obtaining the real user’s identity. 
(5) Security: The authentication scheme has to resist different kinds of attacks like DoS attacks, smart card stolen attacks, 
password-guessing attacks, insider attacks, and content alteration attacks. 
3.4. Threat model 
The objective of an attacker in an authenticated system is to gain access to the target system or to disrupt the service. 
The attack process can be active attacks or passive attacks. The following are the assumptions of the capabilities of an 
attacker presented in our work. 
(1) The information from the smart card can be retrieved by power analysis attacks or leaking of information from the smart 
card [25] . 
(2) An attacker is able to perform offline and online password guessing attacks after getting information from the smart 
card. 
(3) Protocols are not kept secret from an attacker. 
(4) The message eavesdropped by an attacker can be modified, redirected, deleted or resent. 
(5) An attacker can trace a specific user involved in the protocol when some parameters of the protocols are constant 
throughout the protocol session. 
(6) An attacker can be inside of a targeted organization server or can be a legitimate user. 
A number of different attacks can be launched in single-server and multi-server environments. Here, we present the brief 
description of each attack. 
Impersonation Attack : This is an attack in which an adversary assumes the credentials of a legitimate entity during the 
communications among the entities in the protocol run. 
Key Compromise Attack : This is an attempt performed by an adversary to recover the cryptographic keys used in a certain 
protocol. 
Insider Attack : This is an adversarial threat that originates from within the premises of the network, and can be caused 
by an employee with access to information regarding security features of the target entity. 
Session Key Attack : This is an attack performed by an adversary by exploiting cryptographic keys that are used in a 
specific session run for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access. 
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Table 1 
Notations and their descriptions used in this work. 
Symbol Definition 
x the secret value of registration center (RC) in multi-server design 
RC the registration center 
ID i the identity of the user i 
MID i the masked identity of the user i 
SID j the identity of the server j 
MSID j the masked identity of the server j 
PW i the password of user i 
MPW i the masked password of the user i 
BIO i biometric information of the user i 
h (.) a collision resistant hash function 
y the server’s private key in a single server 
r i a random number 
PSK a secure pre-shared key between RC and the server 
pub j the public key of the application server j 
pri v j the private key of the application server j 
E k () the encryption process with the key k 
D k () the decryption process with the key k 
 an XOR operator 
‖ a concatenation operator 
Replay Attack : The adversary performs the attack by capturing the current session information for the purposes of using 
it later to gain access to the target system. 
Denial of service Attack : In this attack, the aim of an adversary is to make targeted resources unavailable for the intended 
receivers of the service. 
4. Proposed SUAA authentication scheme 
The proposed schemes consist of two participants in the single-server design and three participants in the multi-server 
design. The participants include: 1) Users who request access to a service from the remotely located server, 2) Application 
server, which is responsible for service provision to the users, and 3) Registration Center (RC), which is responsible for the 
initialization smart card and providing application server with the credentials that are used to authenticate the user. 
In the single-server authentication scheme, each user is required to register for a service. The design forces the user to 
have multiple usernames and passwords for each registered service. For a multi-server authentication scheme, the design is 
different as multiple services are distributed on the different servers. The architecture for multi-server requires the central 
registration center for the users and servers registration. From this difference in the architecture design, in this section, 
we present two schemes for both single-server and multi-server designs. The notations used in our proposed schemes are 
shown in the Table 1 . 
4.1. Single-server authentication design 
For a single-server authentication design, the proposed scheme has two processes which include registration and lo- 
gin/authentication. The scheme also allows the user to change the password. The processes and steps of the scheme are 
presented below. 
4.1.1. Registration process 
During the registration, the following are the steps performed on a secure channel before the smart card is given to the 
user. 
Step 1: The user U i chooses ID i and the password PW i , scans the biometric BIO i , and a random number R i is gener- 
ated for the user’s smart card. Then, the hash value of the user identity is computed as I D ih = h (I D i ) , and the user 
masked password is P W im = h (ID ih || R i || P W i ) . Next, the user generates the registration request REG = h (P W im  BIO i ) . 
Afterwards, U i submits ID ih , PW im , and REG i to the server S . 
Step 2: When S receives { I D ih , REG i = h (P W im  BI O i ) } from U i , the server looks for the match of the received hash value 
of the user’s identity and the hash value from the lookup table of registered users. If no match is found, then the 
hash value of the user’s identity ID ih is stored on the server. Otherwise, the user needs to change ID i . Following this, 
the server computes D i = h (ID ih || REG i ) and generates a random number R x that is used to conceal the server’s private 
key. The server proceeds by calculating the masked private key K mx = h (y || R x ) , where y is the server’s private key. 
The server then computes A i = h (ID ih || K mx ) and B i = A i  P W im . Also the server generates another random number R s 
and computes U i ’s masked identity I D im = E k (I D ih || R s ) by using the symmetric algorithm. After that, the server stores 
{ B i , D i , ID im , E k (.)/ D k (.), h (.)} on the smart card, where k = K mx , and provides it to U i , where A i , B i and D i are the 
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Fig. 1. The registration process in a single-server system. 
Fig. 2. Login and authentication process on a single server. 
cryptogram. The random number used to conceal the server private key helps to secure the server’s private key. For 
each session, a new random number is generated, and the server’s private key loaded on the memory for encryption 
will be different and can resist the memory disclosure attacks. 
Step 3: The random number R i is stored into the smart card, which now stores 
{ B i , D i , ID im , R i , E k mx (. ) /D k mx (. ) , h (. ) } . The registration process is illustrated in Figure 1 . 
4.1.2. Login and authentication process 
In this process, the two participants authenticate one another and a session key is generated. The session key will be 
used for further encryption and decryption for this specific session only. The following are the steps required for the au- 
thentication process and key generation. The steps are presented in Figure 2 . 
Step 1: The smart card is inserted into the card reader by U i and then provides ID i , PW i , and scans BIO i . 
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Step 2: The smart card generates a hash value of the entered identity I D ih = h (I D i ) and computes D ∗i = h (ID ih ‖ h (h (ID i ‖ 
R i ‖ P W i )  BIO i )) . The smart card then checks if D ∗i = D i holds. If the two values are different, the session is termi- 
nated by the smart card. 
Step 3: The smart card computes A i = B i  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W i ) = h ( ID ih ‖ k mx ), generates a random number RN i , afterwards 
computes M 1 = E A i (ID ih ‖ RN i ‖ ID im ‖ T 1 ) , where T 1 is the current session time on the smart card. The smart card 
next sends the login request to the server LOGIN { ID im , M 1 , T 1 }. 
Step 4: When the server receives the login request from the user’s smart card, the server checks the current time stamp 
on the server T 2 and computes the time difference 
 T = T 2 − T 1 . If the difference is greater than the required transfer 
time, the session is terminated by the server. Otherwise, the server decrypts the masked identity of the user ID im 
using the masked server’s private key k mx to obtain D k mx (ID im ) = ID ih ‖ R s . The server computes A ∗i = h (ID ih ‖ k mx ) , 
decrypts M 1 as D A ∗
i 
(M 1 ) to obtain ID ih , RN i , ID im , and T 1 . The server then compares the received values of ID im and T 1 
from the login message with the values from D A ∗
i 
(M 1 ) . If the values are different, the server terminates the session. 
Step 5: The server generates two random numbers R new 
i and RN s , computes a new masked identity for the user as ID 
new 
im = 
E k mx (ID ih ‖ R new i ) and the challenge message C s = E A ∗i (ID new im ‖ RN s ‖ ID ih ‖ RN i ) . The server then sends the challenge 
message to the user’s smart card as CHALLENGE { C s }. 
Step 6: When the challenge message from the server is received by the smart card, the smart card decrypts the challenge 
D A i (C s ) to obtain ID 
new 
i , RN s , ID ih , and RN i . The smart card then checks if ID ih and RN i are the same as those sent to the 
server during the login. The smart card then computes the response message of the received challenge R c = h (RN s ‖ 
ID new 
im ‖ RN i ) and replies back to the server with the response message RESPONSE { R c } and computes the session key 
SK as SK = h (RN i ‖ A i ‖ RN s ) . 
Step 7: When the server receives the response message from the smart card, the server computes R ∗c = h (RN s ‖ ID new im ‖ 
RN u ) and checks if R 
∗
c is the same as the received response R c . If the two values differ, the server terminates the 
session. Otherwise, the server confirms that it is communicating with the correct smart card that initiated the session. 
The server then generates the session key SK as SK = h (RN i ‖ A ∗i ‖ RN s ) . This confirms mutual authentication between 
the server and the smart card. 
4.1.3. The password change process 
Our scheme allows the user to change the password when needed. The password change process is as follows: 
Step 1: The user inserts the card into the reader and provides ID i , PW i and BIO i . 
Step 2: The smart card computes I D ih = h (I D i ) and D ∗i = h (ID ih h (h (ID i ‖ R i ‖ P W i )  BIO i )) . The smart card compares D ∗i 
with D i . If D 
∗
i  = D i , the session is ended. 
Step 3: The smart card alerts the user to enter the new password P W new 
i . The user enters P W 
new 
i and the 
smart card computes B new 
i = B i  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W i )  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W new i ) = A i  P W im  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W i )  h (ID ih ‖ 
R i ‖ P W new i ) = A i  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W i )  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W i )  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W new i ) = A i  h (ID ih ‖ R i ‖ P W new i ) . Then, the 
value of B i is replaced by B 
new 
i from the smart card. 
4.2. Multi-server authentication design 
The SUAA scheme is designed under the assumption that the RC and the application server are based on the trust com- 
puting architecture. This assumption assures that it is infeasible for adversaries to retrieve the keys from the RC and applica- 
tion server. Also, the user’s biometric information is assumed to be an exact match during the registration and login process. 
The techniques proposed in [24] , [43] are useful in generating secure biometric templates for authentication. The proposed 
scheme has three processes which include user registration, server registration, and login/authentication. The SUAA scheme 
also allows users to change passwords. The same notations are used as described earlier. 
4.2.1. Registration processes 
Server registration process. In order to become an authorized server, a registration request is sent to RC by the application 
server through a secure channel. The request for registration includes the application server identity SID j and its public key 
pub j . The RC then replies back to the server with PSK and x through a secure channel like Internet Key Exchange version 2 
(IKEv2) and publishes the application server’s public key. 
User registration 
The user needs to register with RC first before it can communicate to remote application servers. The smart card, the 
biometric information, and the user identity are then used to authenticate and request access to the application server. The 
following are the steps for user registration to RC. The process of registration is shown in Figure 3 . It is important to note 
that the process here is different from that described for the single-server environment. 
Step 1: U i picks the identity ID i , the password PW i , a random number r i , and scans BIO i . 
Step 2: U i conceals the password MP W i = h (ID i ‖ r i ‖ P W i ) and computes REG = h (MP W i  BIO i ) . 
Step 3: U i sends the registration request to RC as { ID i , REG = h (MP W i  BIO i ) } . 
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Fig. 3. User registration at Registration Center. 
On receiving the request of registration from U i , RC performs the following steps: 
Step 4: The RC generates A i = h (ID i ‖ x ) , B i = h (A i ) , and C i = h (REG = h (MP W i  BIO i )) B i . 
Step 5: The RC generates a random number R ci for U i , computes MI D i = E x (I D i ‖ R ci ) and D i = P SK MID i , and personal- 
izes the smart card by storing { MID i , B i , C i , D i , h (.)}. 
Step 6: The random number r i is inserted into the smart card, which now contains SC = { MID i , r i , B i , C i , D i , h (. ) } . The 
smart card is handed to U i . 
4.2.2. Login and authentication process 
This section explains the process when U i wants to login and be authenticated to the specific service server S j , where 
1 ≤ j ≤ k . The process for session key generation is also presented. The authentication and session key agreement process is 
shown in Figure 4 and explained in the following steps: 
Step 1: The smart card is inserted into the card reader and U i inputs ID i , PW i and scans BIO i . 
Step 2: B ∗
i is computed by the smart card as B 
∗
i = C i  h ((h (ID i ‖ r i ‖ P W i )  BIO i ) . The smart card next checks if B ∗i = B i . 
If B ∗
i  = B i , then the login process is terminated. If the two values do not match for three consecutive trials within 
defined threshold time, the smart card is blocked. 
Step 3: Subsequently, the smart card generates a random number R i , computes M 1 = h (B i )  R i , M 2 = h (R i ‖ MID i ‖ D i ‖ 
T 1 ) where T 1 is the current time on the smart card and M 3 = E pub j (MID i , M 1 ) . 
Step 4: The login request from the smart card is sent to the server S j as LOGIN { M 2 , M 3 , SID j , T 1 }. 
Step 5: After the request from U i is received, the server S j checks the difference between the received login request 
time T 1 and the server time T 2 as 
 T = T 2 − T 1 , if the difference is greater than the required transfer time, the server 
terminates the process. 
Step 6: The server decrypts M 3 as D pri v j (M 3 ) to obtain MID i and M 1 . The server also decrypts the masked identity to get 
the real identity of the user as D x (MID i ) = ID i ‖ R ci . 
Step 7: Afterwards, the server computes A ∗
i = h (ID i ‖ x ) and R i = M 1  h 2 ( A ∗i ) . 
Step 8: The server computes M ∗
2 = h (R i ‖ MID i ‖ (P SK MID i ) ‖ T 1 ) and checks if M 2 = M ∗2 . If M 2  = M ∗2 , the session is 
terminated. 
Step 9: The application server generates two random numbers R j and R 
new 
j , computes x 
∗ = h (R i ‖ T 3 ) where T 3 is the 
current server time, and generates a temporary identity for U i as MID 
new 
i = h (ID i ‖ R new j ) . 
Step 10: The server then computes a challenge message M 4 = E x ∗ ( MID new i ‖ R j ‖ R i ‖ ID i ‖ R new j ‖ SID j ) and the masked 
identity of the server MSID j = h (SID j  R j ) . Then it sends the challenge to U i as CHALLENGE { M 4 , MSID j , T 3 }. 
Step 11: On receiving the challenge message from the server, the smart card checks the difference in the time inter- 
val from the received server time and its time 
 T = T 4 − T 3 , where T 4 is the current smart card time. If the time 
difference is greater than the allowed interval, the smart card ends the session. 
Step 12: The smart card computes x ∗ = h (R i ‖ T 3 ) and decrypts M 4 as D x ∗ (M 4 ) to obtain MID new i , R j , R i , R new j , ID i and SID j . 
Step 13: The smart card computes MID new ∗
i = h (ID i ‖ R new ∗j ) and MSID ∗j = h (SID j  R j ) . It then checks if M SID j = M SID ∗j , 
and if MID new ∗
i = MID new i . The smart card checks if R i and ID i are the same as those sent to the server on the login 
request, if the values do not match, the session is terminated. 
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Fig. 4. Login and authentication scheme in the multi-server environment. 
Step 14: The smart card computes the response message M 5 = h (R j ‖ MID i new ‖ R i ) and the session key SK i j = h (R i ‖ B i ‖ 
SID j ‖ R j ) and replies back with the response RESP { M 5 } to the application server S j . 
Step 15: After the response is received, the application server S j computes M 
∗
5 = h (R j ‖ MID new i ‖ R i ) . It checks if M ∗5 = M 5 . 
If M ∗5  = M 5 , then the server terminates the session. 
Step 16: The server computes the session key SK i j = h (R i ‖ h 2 (ID i ‖ x ) ‖ SID j ‖ R j ) . At this stage, the mutual authenti- 
cation between the user and the server is attained and the session key between the two communicating entities is 
generated. 
4.2.3. Change password process 
The change password process has the following steps. 
Step 1: The smart card is inserted into the reader by the user. The user then enters the identity ID i , the password PW i , 
and scans BIO i . 
Step 2: B ∗
i = C i  h (h (ID i ‖ r i ‖ P W i )  BIO i ) is computed on the card. 
Step 3: The smart card checks if B ∗
i = B i from the card. If B ∗i  = B i , the session is terminated. 
Step 4: The smart card prompts the user for a new password P W new 
i , and then computes C 
new 
i = C i  h (h (ID i ‖ r i ‖ P W i ) 
BIO i )  h (h (ID i ‖ r i ‖ P W new i )  BIO i ) . 
Step 5: The smart card updates the value of C i with C 
new 
i . 
5. Security analysis 
In this section, we will give the security analysis for the single-server authentication and the multi-server authentica- 
tion. The analysis establishes that both schemes are suitable for the authentication process and resistant to aforementioned 
attacks. 
5.1. Security analysis in single-server authentication 
5.1.1. Resistance to key-compromise attacks 
The security of the data relies on the security of the system’s private key. If, for the privileged user who can recover the 
server’s private key, the user is able to determine the value of A i = h (ID i || y ) , it can compromise the system. To overcome 
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such attacks, on every authentication session the server’s private key is concealed with a random number. This provides the 
assurance that even if the secret key is compromised, the adversary is not able to have access to the key used during the 
next session, since the private key is K mx = h (y || R x ) and is different in every session. 
5.1.2. Anonymity of the user 
U i ’s ID is transmitted in the masked form ID im instead of the plaintext form to the server for authentication. ID im is the 
encrypted form of U i ’s ID and a random number with the masked server’s private key K mx . It is impossible to reveal the ID i 
without having the masked private key, so the anonymity of the user identity is captured. 
5.1.3. Resistance to privileged insider attacks 
For an adversary with access to the server, it can have access to a user’s identity hash table and the private key of the 
server, but the adversary is not able to attack the system since the secret key used in every session is different from others. 
At each session, before the server’s private key is used, it is first masked with a random number as K mx = h (y || R x ) . This 
makes it difficult for attacks even if an adversary has access to the server’s private key and a user’s identity. 
5.1.4. Resistance to offline-password guessing attacks 
An eavesdropper of communication between the user and the server cannot get enough information to determine the 
password. Assuming the user’s smart card is stolen and information is retrieved from the card, an attacker is not able to 
guess the user’s password since they do not know the masked server’s private key h (ID ∗
ih || K mx ) from B i  h (h (ID i ) || R i || P W ∗i ) . 
5.1.5. Resistance to session key attacks 
The session key is computed as SK = h (RN i || A i || RN s ) . It is difficult for an attacker to compute the session key without 
the knowledge of the values of RN i , A i , and RN s . Also, the decryption of C s for the purpose of acquiring ID 
New 
i , RN s , ID i , and 
RN i which are used to compute SK , requires A i which is kept secret, thus the session key obtainability is impractical for an 
attacker. 
5.1.6. Resistance to user impersonation attacks 
In order to impersonate a user, the adversary needs to retrieve the identity of the user and the password to generate 
a valid login request LOGIN { ID im , M 1 , T 1 }, where M 1 = E A i (ID i || RN i || T 1 || ID im ) . For an adversary to have the value of A i , the 
adversary first needs to have ID i and the password, or the server’s private key y . It is impractical for the adversary because 
the server’s private key is not used as plain y , it is masked first with a random number. This makes infeasible for an attacker 
to generate a valid LOGIN request to the server. 
5.1.7. Resistance to replay attacks 
For an adversary who eavesdrops the communication between the user’s smart card and the server, can try to copy 
information for the purpose of resending later. The adversary will not be able to achieve this goal because every time in 
the information sent to the server, there is a different timestamp and a random number generated in each session. The 
adversary can change the timestamp from the login message sent to the server ( ID im , M 1 , T i ) and resend this request to 
the server for a later time, but the server will be able to detect the difference in timestamps and reject the request after 
decrypting M 1 and comparing the timestamps. 
5.1.8. Resistance to server impersonation attacks 
In order to impersonate the server, the attacker needs to generate the server challenge message CHALL { C s }, which is 
computed by C s = E A ∗
i 
( ID New 
im || RN s || ID ih || RN i ) . Since the attacker is not aware of the server’s concealed private key used during 
the encryption process, it cannot compute A ∗
i = h (ID ih || K mx ) , hence it is not capable of generating the challenge message. 
This proves that the attacker cannot impersonate the server. 
5.2. Security analysis in multi-server authentication 
5.2.1. Anonymity of the user 
In our proposed scheme, the identity of the user is masked, which makes tracking of the user difficult. At the login phase, 
the user’s identity is transported in encrypted form E pub j (MID i ) to the application server. For the attacker to have access 
to the transmitted identity, it needs to have the server’s private key pri v j . The application server replies back to the user 
with the user’s temporary identity MID i 
new which is different from the one sent first to the application server. The user’s 
temporary identifier is also encrypted with the generated temporary key x ∗∗. This makes it difficult to trace the specific user 
on the same session. 
5.2.2. Mutual authentication 
For the communicating parties, mutual authentication is required because each party needs to verify the entity they 
communicate with. In our proposed scheme from step 10 in section 4.2.2 , mutual authentication is attained before agreeing 
to the generation of the session key. It is infeasible for an attacker to have access to the user’s identity and generate the 
challenge and response messages transmitted. This shows that our scheme guarantees mutual authentication between the 
communicating entities. 
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5.2.3. Replay attacks 
The proposed scheme is secure against replay attacks. The session timer between the communicating entities is checked. 
If the difference in time is greater than the threshold time for the specific session, then the session is ended by either the 
user or the server. If an attacker tries to intercept the login message LOGIN { M 2 , M 3 , SID j , T 1 } and modify the message and 
resend the modified content to the server S j , the server will reject the message since there will be a difference in time. Also, 
M ∗
2 and M 2 are different. This makes the application server S j reject the attacker login request. 
5.2.4. Server impersonation attacks 
For an attacker server S k to impersonate another legitimate server S j , it needs to have access to the server’s private key 
pri v j . Assume an attacker server S k intercepts the login message LOGIN { M 2 , M 3 , SID j , T 1 } between the user U i and the server 
S j . For an attacker to have access to MID i and M 1 , an attacker has to decrypt M 3 as D pri v j (M 3 ) . This process requires an 
attacker S k to have the server S j ’s private key, which is impossible for an attacker to have access to. 
5.2.5. Denial of service attacks 
Our scheme is resistant to denial of service attacks. At every login session, the server checks the difference of the times- 
tamps. Assume the attacker generates the login messages { M 2, 1 , M 3, 1 , T 1, 1 }, { M 2, 2 , M 3, 2 , T 1, 2 }, ..., { M 2, n , M 3, n , T 1, n } and 
sends these messages to the server S j . The server will check the timestamps on every login message received, and can detect 
the difference and also M ∗2 is different from M 2 . 
5.2.6. The man-in-the-middle attack 
An attacker who wants to execute such attacks first intercepts the login message { M 2 , M 3 , T 1 }. The attacker generates 
the random number R at , then computes M 2 
at = h (R at ‖ MID i ‖ D i ‖ T at ) . However, to generate M 3 , an attacker needs to have 
access to M 1 and the real user identity which is transmitted in encrypted form during all the sessions. This makes it difficult 
for such an attack to be successful. 
5.2.7. forward secrecy 
For an attacker to successfully run this attack, even if the attacker has access to x , the application server’s identity 
SID j , and the user’s identity ID i , the attacker cannot figure out the session key without having R i and R j which are random 
numbers for the user and the application server. This random number is generated every time in the specific session. Hence, 
the attack will fail. 
5.2.8. No verification table 
In our scheme, the RC and the service providing server do not store the user verifier table or biometric information on 
their storage space. For an insider adversary, it is not possible to have access to the user information required for authentica- 
tion from the RC or the service providing server. This ensures that our scheme guarantees security from insider adversaries 
on both sides from the RC and the server. 
6. Proof of Authentication 
This section presents the proof of authentication of our schemes. BAN logic was used to prove the authentication of 
single-server and multi-server designs. The logic has the rules as explained in [26] . To prove an authentication protocol is 
secure, a series of assumptions have been made to guarantee the success of the protocol. These assumptions are standard 
for such type of protocols. They include which part of the communicating entities generate a nonce and what cryptographic 
keys are initially shared among the communicating entities. The authentication scheme is assumed to be complete if the 
communicating entities A and B and the key K between them satisfy that A believes that B 
K ←→ A and B also believes that 
A 
K ←→ B . 
6.1. Single-server environment 
In this section, a formal method for authentication protocol analysis (BAN logic) is used to prove the correctness of our 
scheme. 
6.1.1. Goal of authentication 
Our proposed scheme for single-server authentication is considered complete if it meets the following goals: 
(1) U i belie v es (U i 
SK ←→ S) . 
(2) S belie v es (U i 
SK ←→ S) . 
According to [39] , BAN logic has the following steps to analyze protocols: 
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6.1.2. Idealization 
The protocol is idealized as: 
(1) The Message M 1: U i −→ S: ({ ID i , N} K mx , { ID i , RN i , T i , { ID i , N} K mx } A i ) . 
(2) The Message M 2: S −→ U i : ({ ID new im , RN s , ID i , RN i } A i ) . 
(3) The Message M 3: U i −→ S: ( RN s , ID im , RN i ). 
The idealized messages correspond to the message flow in the protocol between two communicating parties. 
6.1.3. Assumptions 
Following assumptions hold for the initial state of the protocol. 
A 1 : U i belie v es U i 
A i ←→ S. 
A 2 : S belie v es U i 
A i ←→ S. 
A 3 : U i belie v es f resh (RN i ) . 
A 4 : S belie v es f resh (RN s ) . 
The first two assumptions are related to the trust of shared key A i between the user U i and the server S . The third and 
fourth assumptions are for the freshness of the random numbers generated. The goal is to indicate the trust of computed 
session key between the user’s smart card and the server. 
6.1.4. Proof and derivation 
Here, we analyze the protocol by applying the rules and assumptions. 
(1) From M 1, S recei v es ({ ID i , N} K mx , { ID i , RN i , T i , { ID i , N} K mx } A u ) . By applying the message-meaning rule, and the assumption 
A 1 , we get step (2). 
(2) S belie v es U i sent (ID i , RN i , T i , { ID i , N} K mx ) . 
(3) From M 2, we get U i recei v ed ({ ID new im , RN s , ID i , RN i } A i ) . From the message-meaning rule and the assumption A 1 applied 
on (3), we obtain step (4) below. 
(4) U i belie v es S sent ( ID new im , RN s , ID i , RN i ) . With the nonce-verification rule and the assumption A 3 applied to step 4, we 
reach step (5). 
(5) U i belie v es S belie v es ( ID new im , RN s , ID i , RN i ) . From the assumption A 2 , and proves from steps 4 and 5, and the session key 
SK = h (RN i || A i || RN s ) , we obtain (6). 
(6) U i belie v es S belie v es (U i 
SK ←→ S) . And from this with the jurisdiction rule, we conclude that U i belie v es (U i SK ←→ S) . 
(7) From M 3 , S sees (RN s , RN i , ID 
new 
im ) . By applying the message-meaning rule, we get (8). 
(8) S belie v es U i said (RN s , RN i ) . By using the nonce-verification rule and the assumptions A 3 and A 4 , we obtain (9). 
(9) S belie v es U i belie v es (RN s , RN i ) . From the computation of the session key as in (5), we reach (10). 
(10) S belie v es U i belie v e (U i 
SK ←→ S) . With the jurisdiction rule, we conclude that S belie v es (U i SK ←→ S) . This concludes the proof 
of our scheme. 
6.2. Multi-server environment 
The scheme is considered to be complete if it meets the following goals: 
(1) U i believes that U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . 
(2) U i believes that the server S j believes U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . 
(3) The server S j believes that U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . 
(4) The server S j believes that U i believes U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . 
6.2.1. Idealization 
The idealization process corresponds to the message flows between two communicating entities participating in the 
protocol. The following are the messages that flow for U i and the server S j . 
(1) The Message M1: U i → S j : ({ MID i , ID i , x } pubj , B i , R i , T 1 , PSK , SID j ). 
(2) The Message M2: S j → U i : ( { MID i new , R j , R i , ID i , SID j , R j new } x ∗ , T 3 , MSID j ). 
(3) The Message M3: U i → S j : ( R i , MID i new , R j ). 
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6.2.2. Assumptions 
The following are the assumptions of the initial state for our scheme. 
A1: U i | ≡  (R i , R j , R j new ) . 
A2: S j | ≡  (R i , R j , R j new ) . 
A3: U i | ≡  ( T 1 , T 3 ). 
A4: S j | ≡  ( T 1 , T 3 ). 
A5: U i | ≡ S j | ≡ SID j . 
A6: S j | ≡U i | ≡ ID i . 
A7: U i | ≡pubj | → S j . 
A8: U i | ≡ U i x 
∗
←→ S j . 
A9: S j | ≡ U i x 
∗
←→ S j . 
A1 and A2 mean that U i and S j generate fresh random numbers. Also, A3 and A4 show that U i and S j use the time T 1 
and T 3 respectively. A5 indicates that the server S j believes its identity SID j and U i believes the identity of the server it 
communicates with. A6 shows the server believes the identity of the user they communicate according to the belief rule. 
The assumption A7 means that U i believes the public key pub j of the server and thus the server owns its corresponding 
private key pri v j . A8 and A9 indicate that the secret key x ∗ can be computed by both U i and S j . Our goal is to confirm that 
S j and U i both generate the session key SK ij . And each communicating entity believes that the ownership of the session key 
of another entity holds. 
6.2.3. Proof 
In this section, we use the assumptions and logic rules presented earlier to achieve the aforementioned goals of our 
scheme. 
Step 1: From M1: S j  ( MID i , R i , T 1 , SID j , ID i ). With assumptions A2, A4 and the message-meaning rule, we get step 2. 
Step 2: S j | ≡U i | ∼ ( MID i , R i , T 1 , SID j , ID i ). According to A1, A3 and the believing rule and nonce verification rule, we get 
step 3. 
Step 3: S j | ≡U i | ≡ ( MID i , R i , T 1 , SID j , ID i ). 
Step 4: From M2: U i  ({ MID i new , R j , R i , ID i , T 3 , SID j , R j new } x ∗ , MSID j ) . From A1, A3, A8, A9, and the message-meaning rule, 
we get step 5. 
Step5: U i | ≡ S j | ∼ ( MID i new , R j , R i , ID i , T 3 , SID j , R j , R j new , MSID j ) . According to the believing rule, we obtain step 6. 
Step 6: U i | ≡ S j | ≡ ( MID i new , R j , R i , ID i , T 3 , SID j , R j , R j new , MSID j ) and the session key, which is computed as SK i j = h (R i ‖ 
h 2 (ID i ‖ x ) ‖ SID j ‖ R j ) . We obtain step 7. 
Step 7: U i | ≡ S j | ≡ U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j and with the jurisdiction rule we obtains U i | ≡ U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . We achieve our goals (Goal 1 and 
Goal 2). 
Step 8: From M3: we have, S j  (R j , R i , MID i 
new ) . From the message-meaning rule, we get step 9. 
Step 9: S j | ≡ U i | ∼ (R j , R i , MID i new ) . By the nonce verification rule and the assumptions A2 and A4, we get the step 10. 
Step 10: S i | ≡ U i | ≡ (R j , R i , MID i new ) and according to step 6 above, SK i j = h (R i ‖ h 2 (ID i ‖ x ) ‖ SID j ‖ R j ) , we get step 11. 
Step 11: S j | ≡ U i | ≡ U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . From the jurisdiction rule, we get step 12. 
Step 12: S j | ≡ U i 
SK i j ←−→ S j . This achieves goal 3 and goal 4, which concludes our proof. 
The above proof shows that the intended goals are achieved. This proves our scheme achieves mutual authentication 
between the participants and U i , and S j believes that the session key SK i j = h (R i ‖ h 2 (ID i ‖ x ) ‖ SID j ‖ R j ) is shared between 
them. 
7. Evaluation 
To show the security of the proposed schemes for the single-server and multi-server design, we perform a broad secu- 
rity and performance evaluation. The computation time used in this paper was evaluated based on the experimental results 
presented by Kilinc and Yanik [13] . Their results showed that the average computational time for hash functions, symmetric 
encryptions, and decryptions are 0.0 023ms, 0.0 046ms, and 0.0 046ms respectively. Point addition is 0.0288ms, point multi- 
plication is 2.226ms, public key encryption is 3.85ms, decryption is 3.85ms, and modular exponentiation is 3.85ms. The XOR 
operation time and modular multiplication were not considered. 
7.1. Performance and security evaluation for single-server authentication 
The performance and security evaluation for a single-server scheme is presented in this section. Table 2 and Table 3 
present the performance and security evaluation respectively. It is observed that most of the schemes are designed using 
cryptographic hash functions and exclusive-OR operations. 
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Table 2 
Comparison on performance of proposed scheme with related schemes in a single-server environment. 
Protocols Registration Login & Authentication Cryptographic operation Time (ms) 
Proposed 5A + 1B+1C 9A + B+3C+3D 12A + 2B+7E 0.0598 
Morteza et al. [29] 2A + 1B+1C 6A + 1B+3C+3D 8A + 2B+7E 0.0506 
Kumari et al. [14] 4A + 5B 14A + 13B 18A + 18B 0.0414 
Chang et al. [4] 2A + 1B 10A + 6B 12A + 7B 0.0276 
Wang et al. [41] 2A + 2B 8A + 14B 10A + 16B 0.0230 
Wen and Li [42] 5A + 4B 22A + 18B 27A + 22B 0.0621 
Das et al. [7] 2A + 1B 9A + 14B 11A + 15B 0.0253 
∗ A: number of times the hash function is performed( T h (.) ), B: number of times XOR operation is peformed 
( T XOR () ), C: number of times for encryption process ( T Enc () , D: number of times for the decryption process 
( T Dec () ), E: total encryption and decryption operations. 
Table 3 
Security evaluation of the scheme proposed with the related works in a single-server environment. 
Attacks ∗ Proposed Morteza et al. [29] Kumari et al. [14] Chang et al. [4] Wang et al. [41] Wen & Li [42] Das et al. [7] 
A  ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
B   ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ 
C  ✗  ✗  ✗  
D     ✗   
E      ✗ ✗ 
F        
G     ✗ ✗  
H      ✗  
∗ A: Password guessing attacks, B: User anonymity attacks, C: Insider attacks, D: User impersonation Attacks, E: Server impersonation 
attacks, F: Replay Attacks, G: Session key attacks, H: Stolen verifier attacks. 
7.1.1. Performance evaluation 
The performance of the proposed scheme is discussed with respect to the cryptographic operations used in the im- 
plementation of the protocol. The performance evaluation of the proposed scheme is done in relation to related works. 
We calculated the total computational cost for each scheme based on execution time. The execution time of the proposed 
single-server scheme for the registration and login/authentication phases is shown in Table 2 . The proposed scheme con- 
sumes less time compared to that in [42] while providing better defense against different attacks. As other schemes do not 
provide protection against all attacks, hence the time consumption is acceptable. This proves that our scheme is reliable for 
authentication in a single-server environment. 
7.1.2. Security evaluation 
An authentication and key agreement scheme needs to have significant security features to prevent different attacks. 
The use of random numbers provides the freshness of the security feature and protect the scheme from attacks like replay 
attacks. Masking of the user’s ID and the password helps to prevent impersonation attacks and offline password guessing 
attacks. In Table 3 , different schemes are evaluated for various attacks. Some hash-based schemes are still defenseless to 
several attacks. The proposed scheme proves to be secure against the aforesaid attacks and proves to be reliable. 
7.2. Performance and security evaluation for the multi-server environment 
This section presents the performance and security evaluation of the proposed SUAA scheme and the related schemes 
for multi-server design. Table 4 shows the computational time of cryptographic operations for proposed and the related 
schemes. Table 5 describes the security properties evaluation. 
7.2.1. Performance evaluation 
From Table 4 , it can be observed that the hash-based schemes use less time to perform the authentication process 
compared to public key based scheme. Most of the public key based schemes use more time to complete the authentication 
process, but also hold more security properties. The performance comparison of the related works and the proposed scheme 
shows that our scheme uses less time compared to related schemes that use public key cryptography. This demonstrates that 
the proposed scheme is effective for the multi-server platforms. 
7.2.2. Security evaluation 
In Table 5 , the security properties were evaluated on the proposed scheme and the related works on multi-server envi- 
ronments. It is observed that most of the attacks are successful on the hash-based schemes. The proposed scheme meets all 
the required security properties to overcome the mentioned attacks and other security attacks. This shows that the scheme 
fulfills the required security requirements for multi-server authentications. 
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Table 4 
Performance evaluation for proposed scheme and related works in the 
multi-server environment. 
Scheme Total cryptographic operations ∗ Time (ms) 
Chuang et al. [6] 17 T h (.) 0.0391 
Mishra et al. [27] 29 T h (.) 0.0667 
Odelu et al. [30] 6 T pm + 24 T h (.) + 6 T S 13.4388 
Kumari S. et al. [36] 6 T me + 2 T m + 10 T h (.) 23.1230 
Alavalapati et al. [32] 21 T h (.) + 4 T pm 8.9523 
Moon et al. [28] 23 T h (.) 0.0529 
Wang et al. [40] 18 T h (.) 0.0414 
Jangirala et al. [12] 11 T h (.) + 4 T me 15.4253 
OURS 24 T h (.) + 4 T S + 2 T P 7.7736 
∗ T h (.) : Time costs for one-way hash function, T pm : Time complexity for 
eleptic-curve point multiplication, T S : Time complexity for symmetric en- 
cryption and decryption, T me : Time complexity for modular exponentia- 
tion, T m : Time complexity for mudular-multiplication, T P : Time complex- 
ity for public key encryption and decryption. 
Table 5 
Security properties for the multi-server environment. 
Property ∗ Mishra et al. [27] Odelu et al. [30] Wang et al. [40] Chuang & Chen [6] Proposed 
A ✗  ✗ ✗  
B      
C      
D ✗   ✗  
E ✗   ✗  
F ✗  ✗ ✗  
G ✗  ✗ ✗  
H   ✗   
I      
J    ✗  
K    ✗  
∗ A: User anonymity and Untraceability, B: Mutual authentication, C: Prevent reply attacks, D: Prevent Man- 
in-the-middle attacks, E: Prevent stolen smart card Attacks, F: Prevent user impersonation attacks, G: Pre- 
vent server impersonation attacks, H: Prevent insider attacks, I: Prevent password guessing attacks, J: For- 
ward secrecy, K: Prevent denial of service attacks. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper proposes a SUAA scheme for the single-server and multi-server environments using smart cards and biometric 
data to overcome the security weaknesses and improve the performance. Comprehensive security analysis for the scheme is 
also presented. The evaluation is done based on BAN Logic to show the correctness of the proposed scheme. The security 
evaluation of SUAA shows that it is secure against different attacks. Furthermore, the computational time is less than ex- 
isting solutions. In future, we plan to reduce the computational time further while maintaining the diverse set of security 
properties. 
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